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ABSTRACT 
 
 The past 40 years have seen an enormous amount of research aimed at 
investigating human reasoning and decision-making abilities.  This research has led to an 
extended debate about the extent to which humans meet the standards of normative 
theories of rationality.  Recently, it has been proposed that dual-process theories, which 
posit that there are two distinct types of cognitive systems, offer a way to resolve this 
debate over human rationality.  I will propose that the two systems of dual-process 
theories are best understood as investigative kinds.  I will then examine recent empirical 
research from the cognitive neuroscience of decision-making that lends empirical support 
to the theoretical claims of dual-process theorists.  I will lastly argue that dual-process 
theories not only offer an explanation for much of the conflicting data seen in decision-
making and reasoning research, but that they ultimately offer reason to be optimistic 
about the prospects of human rationality.              
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 Imagine that you and a friend find a stack of one hundred $1 bills.  Imagine 
further that you come up with a plan to split the money.  The two of you agree that your 
friend will split the hundred dollars however he chooses between the two of you, but that 
you will be able to either accept or reject his offer.  If you accept the offer, the money 
will be divided between the two of you however your friend has divvied it up, but if you 
reject the offer, you will both put the money back where you found it and both leave with 
nothing.  Now imagine that the friend has just made his offer: $90 for him and $10 for 
you.  Do you accept this offer and leave with $10 that you didn’t have before, or reject 
the offer and leave with nothing?  If you are like most people, you will reject the offer.  
And, according to some strict conceptions of economic rationality, you would be 
behaving irrationally when doing so—you would essentially be giving away $10.     
Whether or to what extent humans can fulfill the rationality requirements 
proposed by various normative models of human reasoning and decision-making has 
been a matter of considerable controversy at least since the pioneering work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Tversky & Kahneman 1974).  Many have argued that 
empirical studies have shown that humans are by and large irrational creatures, while 
others have mounted strong arguments which attempt to explain away the apparently 
threatening evidence by showing that human reasoning and decision-making is not too far 
from perfectly rational.   
Much of this debate is a reaction to the large body of research that has followed in 
the wake of Kahneman and Tversky’s initial studies, which has come to be collectively 
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known as the heuristics and biases approach.  In response to this research, which has 
been seen by some as having “bleak implications for human rationality” (Nisbett & 
Borgida 1975), evolutionary psychologists and philosophers have mounted their own 
empirical and conceptual projects, aimed at showing that humans are in fact very close to 
optimally rational.  These two opposed views have generated an enormous amount of 
seemingly contradictory data.  Recently, several researchers have posited that dual-
process theories of reasoning and decision-making, which propose that there are two 
distinct types of systems underlying human cognition, may offer a way to make sense of 
these conflicting results (Evans & Over 1996, Stanovich 1999).  Although dual-process 
theories (detailed in chapter 3) offer much promise for resolving many of the conflicts in 
the rationality debate, they currently suffer from a lack of clarity about what exactly dual-
process theories are.  Although some progress has been made (See Frankish 2004, 
Samuels forthcoming), very little work has been done explicating the criteria for 
membership of the two systems of cognitive processing that comprise dual-process 
theories.  Additionally, it has been left unclear exactly how the two systems interact with 
each other to bring about behavior (though see Evans 2003 and Haidt 2001 for two 
attempts).   
In Chapter 2 I will outline the primary positions within the rationality debate.  
Divergences in human performance from the solutions deemed optimal according to 
various normative theories have led to worries over the extent to which humans are 
rational.  In section 2.1 I will present the normative/descriptive distinction that theorists 
and empirical researchers appeal to when determining whether humans are rational or 
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not.  In section 2.2 I will detail some of the research done in the heuristics and biases 
tradition, which has led many theorists to the pessimistic conclusion that humans are 
systematically irrational.  These pessimistic conclusions have been challenged on several 
fronts. These challenges will be the focus of section 2.3.  I will conclude Chapter 2 by 
suggesting that there is a middle ground between the two traditional positions in the 
debate, and that this position is supported by dual-process theories of reasoning and 
decision-making.  Dual-process theories posit that humans have two distinct types of 
cognition, neutrally termed System 1 and System 2.  System 1 tends to operate quickly, 
automatically, and developed early in our evolutionary history.  System 2, by contrast, 
operates slowly, is consciously controlled, and developed relatively recently in our 
evolutionary history.    
In Chapter 3 I will advance this response by examining how best to conceptualize 
the two systems of dual-process theories.  I will first provide a fairly detailed explication 
of the two types of cognitive processing proposed by dual processes theories (sections 3.1 
and 3.2).  Then I will propose that these two systems should be considered investigative 
kinds, which are similar in many respects to natural kinds.    
Following this conceptual examination, I will turn in Chapter 4 to recent evidence 
from various areas of cognitive neuroscience, particularly research done in the 
developing field of neuroeconomics.  Some have argued that neuroimaging studies of 
reasoning and decision-making tasks have provided substantial evidence for dual-process 
theories.  I will argue that a cognitive neuroscience approach to decision-making research 
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can be highly fruitful and has much to contribute to the study of dual-process theories and 
more broadly to our understanding of human rationality.              
In Chapter 5 I will conclude by pointing to some of the broad implications of a 
dual-process theory of decision-making, highlighting in particular the sense in which 
System 1 and System 2 are aimed at different and sometimes conflicting domains of 
rationality.  Given that the two systems in many cases are in conflict with one another, I 
will argue that a new focus in the normative study of human rationality should be to 
determine when people should respond in accordance with system 1 processes and when 
people should respond in accordance with system 2. Correspondingly, an important 
descripitive project will become determining the extent to which people are able to select 
between the two systems.    
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Chapter 2:  The Rationality Debate 
 Although it has been a crucial concept throughout the history of philosophy, 
psychology, economics, and several other fields,1 the appropriate conception of 
rationality has been a notoriously controversial issue.  However, as Edward Stein (1996) 
has pointed out, most researchers adopt what he calls the “Standard Picture” of 
rationality.  According to the Standard Picture, to be rational is to reason and make 
decisions that accord with the rules of formal logic, probability theory, decision theory 
and other relevant formal systems.  As Stein points out, “if the standard picture of 
reasoning is right, principles of reasoning that are based on such rules are normative 
principles of reasoning, namely they are the principles we ought to reason in accordance 
with” (1996: 4).    Although Stein is right that this project is by and large the default 
position within the debate over human rationality, as we will see in section 2.3 and later 
in Chapter 5, this conception of rationality is far from universally accepted.  
 Starting in the early 1970s, psychologists began to empirically investigate 
whether or to what extent human decision-making actually does accord with the 
standards of these normative systems.  In doing so, they took themselves to be 
investigating the extent to which humans could be considered rational.  The study of 
human reasoning and decision-making became a thriving area of research in psychology, 
and its implications were quickly recognized as a potential threat to traditional 
philosophical methodology.  Philosopher Jonathan Cohen diagnosed the problem for 
philosophy when he wrote:  
                                                 
1
 See chapters 15-22 in Mele & Rawling (2004) for discussion of the role of rationality in specific domains, 
such as gender studies, science, economics, and the law.  
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If psychologists were right, what they say would seriously discredit the 
claims of intuition to provide— other things being equal— dependable 
foundations for inductive reasoning in analytical philosophy….Since at 
many points analytical philosophy has to premise its accounts of reasoning 
on the data of human intuitions, its metaphilosophy can hardly afford to 
ignore this extensive literature. (1986: 149-150) 
 
As Cohen sees it, the question of whether people can rightly be thought of as rational is a 
central problem for philosophy. Without rationality, philosophy as many in the analytic 
tradition practice it would have to be abandoned or largely reconsidered.  Cohen and 
several others quickly mounted responses to this potential threat, and in large part the 
rationality debate has revolved around whether these defenses adequately secured the 
prospect of human rationality.  These defenses have included both philosophical 
arguments and empirical research within evolutionary psychology.      
 
2.1.  The Normative/Descriptive/Prescriptive Distinction 
The study of rationality is typically conceived in terms of three interrelated 
projects, each investigating decision-making at a different level.  The descriptive project 
is concerned with empirically investigating the responses that humans actually give when 
reasoning or making decisions.  The goal of the descriptive project is to create 
empirically adequate models which predict with a high degree of success the responses 
humans will give when presented with various reasoning and decision-making tasks.  A 
descriptive model is therefore successful to the degree that it allows us to predict, given 
specific inputs and background conditions, how a person will reason or the choices they 
will make.  Traditionally the descriptive project has involved the development of these 
models in terms of cognitive mechanisms based on evidence from behavioral responses, 
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but as we will see in Chapter 4, cognitive neuroscience research is beginning to allow 
descriptive models to incorporate evidence about the processing done in the human brain 
(Montague 2006, Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelac 2005, Chorvat and McCabe 2005).   
The normative project, on the other hand, concerns itself with developing systems 
of reasoning that, if adhered to, will lead to optimal reasoning.  Normative systems tell us 
how we ought to reason and the choices we should make if we hope to reason as well as 
possible.  For example, many argue that expected utility and rational choice theory offer 
normative models for practical decision-making, and formal logic and probability theory 
do the same for reasoning and argumentation2.  Much of the motivation behind the work 
done in the descriptive project has been to question whether people do, as a matter of 
fact, perform according to these normative models.     
Although many theorists have claimed that empirical research has shown that 
human decision-making falls short of normative ideals, for reasons I will now address, it 
is highly controversial whether these shortcomings should be interpreted as proof of 
human irrationality.  In addition to the normative ideals set forth by formal systems and 
the descriptive research of psychologists and neuroscientists, the extent to which humans 
can be considered rational also depends on the limits of human cognitive capabilities.  As 
Keith Stanovich has pointed out:  
As interesting as such divergences between normative and descriptive 
models are, they cannot automatically be interpreted as instances of 
human irrationality.  This is because judgments about the rationality of 
                                                 
2
 Briefly, according to expected utility theory, an agent’s choice should be made by comparing the 
weighted averages of each potential outcome of a choice.  Rational Choice Theory says that humans have a 
stable and complete set of preferences, and that humans should maximize their utility in light of these 
preferences.  
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actions and beliefs must take into account the resource-limited nature of 
the human cognitive apparatus. (1999: 3) 
 
Determining the upper limits of our cognitive capabilities and developing systems 
of reasoning and decision-making that optimize our reasoning given these limits is the 
work of the prescriptive project.  The guiding assumption of the prescriptive project is 
that humans cannot be expected to live up to standards of rationality that are impossible 
for them to meet.  As Stephen Stich has put it: “it seems simply perverse to judge that 
subjects are doing a bad job of reasoning because they are not using a strategy that 
requires a brain the size of a blimp” (1990: 27).   
Philosophically, the prescriptive project is often seen as requiring the acceptance 
of an ought-implies-can principle, the basic idea being that we cannot be expected to do 
something that we cannot actually do.  If this principle is accepted, then typically it will 
follow that the normative requirements placed on an agent will be highly constrained 
both by the cognitive abilities of that agent and by the environment the agent is in.  As 
Samuels, Stich, and Faucher point out:  
Human beings do not have the same capacities as God or a Laplacian 
demon, and other (actual or possible) beings – e.g. great apes – may well 
have reasoning capacities that fall far short of those possessed by ordinary 
humans. In which case, if ought implies can, then there may be normative 
standards that one kind of being is obliged to satisfy where another is not. 
(2004: 42)  
  
If the aims of the prescriptive project are taken seriously, then developing a 
thorough understanding of the cognitive abilities of humans takes on an added 
importance, for it not only provides us with purely descriptive information, but will come 
to have a significant impact upon the appropriate norms by which to judge the rationality 
  9  
of agents’ reasoning and decision-making.  Norms of decision-making and reasoning will 
become relativized or bounded by the limitations of the particular agent.  If humans turn 
out to fall far short of the cognitive capacities required for the norms prescribed by 
probability theory and rational choice theory, then it may be that normative models of 
decision-making ultimately come to have very little relevance to most humans’ everyday 
lives.  If it turns out that we are able to achieve something like the norms of rational 
decision-making, then the normative models will be relevant to human life.   
Reasoning and making decisions well is important because it leads to higher 
degrees of goal satisfaction (Stanovich 1999), and if it turns out that humans are capable 
of making optimal choices (or close to them), then the solutions uncovered through work 
in the normative project will be an important tool.  The norms of decision-making will 
also become the prescripts for humans.  If humans turn out to be considerably 
impoverished in their cognitive capabilities due to the limits of human psychology, then 
the normative theories may end up being less relevant to human decision-making.  We 
would still need to devise methods to get our reasoning as close to normatively optimal as 
possible, but these could very well turn out to be so substantially removed from the 
normative solutions as to make the normative models unimportant.3 
 Even if the normative model ended up having very little in common with the 
prescriptive model best suited for humans, the question of optimal decision-making 
would still be an important question.  It is certainly not out of the question that other 
types of systems, particularly artificial systems such as computers, might be able to meet 
                                                 
3
 In this sense even if our prescriptive models are significantly different from optimality, they will still need 
to take the normative project into account. 
  10  
the standards of the normative models.  Jonathan Baron (1985) makes this point when he 
writes:  
Although normative models may not provide] a good prescriptive model 
for ordinary people, it can be seen as a good prescriptive model for some 
sort of idealized creature who lacks some constraint that people really 
have.… We may thus think of normative models as prescriptive models 
for idealized creatures.… A good prescriptive model takes into account 
the very constraints that a normative model is free to ignore. (8-11)  
 
These three distinct but interrelated projects illustrate the inherently 
interdisciplinary nature of the study of human rationality.  The determination of whether 
humans are rational or not involves both empirical research of human cognition as well as 
theoretical and philosophical work aimed at determining both optimal reasoning and 
decision-making as well as what the implications of descriptive findings are for the 
norms which are ultimately prescribed for humans.  In the following sections two 
approaches to the empirical study of reasoning and decision-making and the conclusions 
(one highly pessimistic of human rationality, the other highly optimistic) that have been 
made based on the findings will be addressed.  These two positions have historically been 
opposed to one another.  The rationality debate is by and large a debate about which of 
these two positions is correct.  After detailing these two views, I will suggest that in fact 
these are not the only two positions available within the rationality debate, and that there 
is a third option which is neither as pessimistic nor as optimistic as the two traditional 
positions within the debate. 
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2.2.  A Reason for Pessimism?  The Heuristics and Biases Approach 
Much of the debate surrounding human rationality has been a response to a body 
of research collectively known as the heuristics and biases program.  Across a wide range 
of empirical studies, humans have been found to perform far below the normative 
standards of decision-making and reasoning (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky 1982, 
Kahneman &Tversky 2000, and Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman 2002).  Based on this 
research, followers of the heuristics and biases tradition have argued that humans should 
be considered irrational, or at minimum that the assumption of rationality made by many 
philosophers and economists is dubious (Samuels & Stich 2004).  After briefly 
illustrating the type of research that falls under the heuristics and biases heading, I will 
describe the theoretical claims offered in response to these findings. 
 One of the earliest and most studied problems in the reasoning and decision-
making literature is Peter Wason’s selection task (Wason 1966).  In this famous task, 
participants are presented with four cards, two of which show a letter (one vowel and one 
consonant) and two of which show a number (one even number and one odd number).  
Participants are told that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other.  
Participants are then told to indicate which cards they would need to flip over in order to 
test the rule: “if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an odd number on the other 
side.”  Most participants correctly selected the vowel to turn over, but most also said that 
the odd number needed to be turned over, which is incorrect.  Moreover, most 
participants failed to say that the even numbered card would need to be turned over.  This 
result, which has been replicated numerous times, has been taken as evidence to support 
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the claim that people systematically deviate from the principles of formal logic.  As we 
will see in section 2.3 however, several alternative explanations of this divergence from 
the normative solution have been offered.   
 Within more explicit decision-making research, similar troubling results have 
been found.  Take, for instance, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) study in which 
participants were given one of two decision tasks.  One group of participants was 
presented with the following problem: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs to 
combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the exact scientific 
estimate is as follows: 
  
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  
  
If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be 
saved and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.         
 
A second group of participants was given a slightly different version that read: 
 
If program C is adopted, 400 people will die.  
 
If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 
a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.      
 
When asked which plan to institute, a large majority in the first group chose 
program A, while participants in the second group heavily favored program D.  This 
intriguing study is troubling for two reasons.  The probabilities of the outcomes in the 
first two programs are the exact same as the probabilities of the outcomes in the second 
two programs.  That is to say, the choice the first group is asked to make is exactly the 
same as the choice the second group is asked to make, and yet we see that participants 
respond significantly differently depending on how the question is framed.  The task 
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takes on an additionally problematic angle because within each group, the expected 
values of the two choices in terms of lives saved or lost are identical.  If participants 
make decisions based on expected utility, then it would be expected that since there is no 
difference between the expected utility of the choices, responses would be split close to 
evenly between the two choices.  The fact that in each group we instead see a significant 
majority favoring one choice over the other is cause to worry that people do not conform 
to the tenets of the theory of expected utility.  Tversky and Kahneman argued that these 
results provided strong evidence that systematically people do not meet the normatively 
predicted solutions for these problems, and that the way in which choices are framed has 
a significant effect on the decisions people make.  They famously concluded that people’s 
decisions are guided not by formal principles like those of logic and decision-theory, but 
instead by heuristics, simple rules which rely on contextual clues and allow for fast, 
efficient, but often sub-optimal choices.    
These two examples illustrate the general project and typical findings of heuristics 
and biases research.  In a number of different tasks, and in comparison to many 
normative models, from formal logic to decision theory, humans appear to underperform 
relative to the normatively predicted solutions.  Based on these kinds of results, several 
increasingly strong conclusions have been drawn by proponents of this research.  
Samuels and Stich (2004) have identified these claims, from least to most controversial, 
as: 
(1) People’s intuitive judgments on a large number of reasoning and 
decision-making problems regularly deviate from appropriate norms of 
rationality. 
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(2) Many of the instances in which our judgments and decisions deviate 
from appropriate norms of rationality are explained by the fact that, in 
making these judgments and decisions, people rely on 
heuristics…“which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and 
sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors.  
 
(3) The only cognitive tools that are available to untutored people are 
normatively problematic heuristics. (2004: 285-286) 
 
As Samuels and Stich point out, while the first two of these conclusions seem at least 
plausible interpretations of the empirical evidence, there is little reason to believe 3 is 
true.  The heuristics and biases program has certainly uncovered many examples in which 
humans deviate from normative conceptions of rationality, and positing heuristics as 
cognitive mechanisms that humans use to make fast decisions is a plausible, although 
certainly not uncontroversial explanation of why humans perform poorly on these tasks.  
But, even given these two conclusions, it does not follow that the only thing we have to 
rely on when making decisions or reasoning are normatively problematic heuristics.  
These pessimistic claims represent one end of the rationality debate.  In the next section, 
several responses to the heuristics and biases findings will be addressed.  
  
2.3.  Panglossian Responses:  Philosophical and Empirical Defenses of Human 
Rationality 
Evolutionary psychologists and several philosophers have been eager to defend an 
optimistic perspective of human reasoning and decision-making abilities.  Highlighting 
this optimism, Stanovich (1999) labeled this position in the debate ‘Panglossian.’  Two 
different Panglossian approaches have been taken.  The first relies upon philosophical 
argument to defend the claim that humans are very close to perfectly rational (Cohen 
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1981; Dennett 1987).  Although this version of the Panglossian position is extremely 
interesting, it has been widely discussed and definitively criticized elsewhere, and is 
considerably outside the focus of this thesis. As such, it will not be considered in any 
detail here4.  Instead, I will focus on a second and more problematic challenge to the 
pessimistic claims of the heuristics and biases tradition.    
The second and perhaps more significant approach to endorsing a Panglossian 
view of human decision-making has been taken by evolutionary psychologists.  As 
Samuels and Stich have illustrated in several articles (Samuels and Stich 2004, Samuels, 
Stich, & Bishop 2000), evolutionary psychologists have responded to the findings of the 
heuristics and biases tradition by mounting a challenge to both the norms that heuristics 
and biases researchers appeal to and their empirical work.  Broadly, evolutionary 
psychologists have argued that in comparing human performance to the normatively 
prescribed responses, the heuristics and biases tradition has been applying confused 
conceptions of probability theory and decision-theory.  Moreover, they argue that when 
you apply the correct norms, people no longer show the dramatic divergences from the 
normative solutions that the heuristics and biases tradition has reported.  Evolutionary 
psychologists have developed an empirical research program aimed at showing how, by 
taking into consideration our evolutionary history, it is possible to illustrate both how 
good humans actually are at reasoning and also why humans perform poorly on specific 
tasks such as those used in the heuristics and biases studies.   
                                                 
4
 For what I take to be definitive criticisms of the philosophical Panglossianism of Dennett and Cohen, see 
Stich 1990, Stanovich 1999, Stein 1996, and Thagard & Nisbett 1983.    
  16  
 Evolutionary psychologists begin their research with several guiding assumptions.  
First, our reasoning and decision-making abilities would have evolved as adaptations to 
problems faced by our evolutionary ancestors.  If this is the case, then humans should 
perform significantly better on problems presented in a way that our ancestors were likely 
to have dealt with than on ones which they would not have been presented with.  Second, 
these adaptations would develop as modules in the mind that are designed by evolution to 
deal with domain specific problems (Samuels & Stich 2004: 288).   
 Starting from these assumptions, evolutionary psychologists, most prominently 
Gerd Gigerenzer, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby have argued that people are in fact 
quite good at meeting many of the normative standards of probability theory, decision 
theory and formal logic provided the information is presented in a format similar to one 
with which our ancestors would have been presented.  Discussing probability, Cosmides 
and Tooby write: “Some of our inductive reasoning mechanisms do embody aspects of a 
calculus of probability, but they are designed to take frequency information as input and 
produce frequencies as outputs” (italics mine 1996: 3).  Gigerenzer (1994) has gone even 
farther, arguing that the heuristics and biases tradition has proved nothing about human 
rationality because they work from a confused notion of probability.  Gigerenzer has 
defended a ‘frequentist’ probability theory, according to which probability statements are 
literally meaningless without some sort of reference class, meaning that probabilities 
cannot be applied to single events.  Almost all reasoning studies which test probability 
performed in the heuristics and biases tradition ask probability questions about single 
events, which Gigerenzer argues makes them ultimately unthreatening to conceptions of 
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human rationality because they are misapplying the norm they are interested in studying.  
When combined, the points made by Cosmides and Tooby and Gigerenzer practically 
guarantee that humans will meet the standards of rationality, for the appropriate 
normative understanding of probability theory is in terms of frequencies, and humans 
have evolved to be quite good at dealing with probabilities when presented as frequencies 
(Samuels, Stich, and Bishop 2002).  According to evolutionary psychology, the cases that 
have been presented by researchers in the heuristics and biases tradition have produced 
virtually meaningless results because their research rests on the wrong normative theory 
of probability.  Remember that according to the Standard Picture of rationality, whether 
or not agents are rational is a matter of whether their reasoning or decision-making 
conforms to the standards of various normative theories.  If the heuristics and biases 
researchers have systematically studied the wrong normative systems, then they 
ultimately have said nothing about human rationality.    
 To show empirically that people do in fact reason well when both inputs and 
outputs are presented in terms of frequencies, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) reformulated a 
task that had been widely used in decision-making research--the Harvard Medical School 
Problem.  The Harvard Medical School Problem was designed to test the Bayesian 
reasoning abilities of faculty and graduate students at Harvard Medical School.  The 
original formulation ran as follows: 
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive 
rate of 5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result 
actually has the disease, assuming that you know nothing about the 
person’s symptoms or signs? (Casscells, Schoenberger, and Grayboys 
1978, 999) 
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The correct Bayesian response to this problem is 2%, but even when presented to faculty 
and students of Harvard, only 18% of participants gave the right answer, with 45% saying 
that the correct answer was 95%.   
 Cosmides and Tooby reformulated this question in terms of frequencies.  Their 
new version read: 
1 out of every 1000 Americans has disease X.  A test has been developed 
to detect when a person has disease X.  Every time the test is given to a 
person who has the disease, the test comes out positive.  But sometimes 
the test also comes out positive when it is given to a person who is 
completely healthy.  Specifically, out of every 1000 people who are 
perfectly healthy, 50 of them test positive for the disease.   
 
Imagine that we have assembled a random sample of 1000 Americans.  
They were selected by lottery.  Those who conducted the lottery had no 
information about the health status of any of these people.  Given the 
information above: 
 
On average, how many people who test positive for the disease will 
actually have the disease?  ____ out of _____ (1996, 24)        
 
Unlike in the original study, and consistent with their ‘frequentist hypothesis,’ Cosmides 
and Tooby found that when presented in the new formulation, more than three quarters of 
participants gave the right answer.  This study, along with several similar studies in 
which studies from the heuristics and biases tradition were rewritten in terms of 
frequencies (Fiedler 1988, Hertwig and Gigerenzer 994) were seen by many as a strong 
challenge to the pessimistic claims made by heuristics and biases researchers.  
 A second example of the evolutionary approach has been the attempts to explain 
responses to various versions of the Wason selection task detailed in 2.2.  The Wason 
selection task has been shown to be highly context-dependent, but exactly what aspects of 
context play a role in success at the selection task has been a matter of considerable 
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confusion.  For instance, in a well know reformulation of the selection task, Griggs and 
Cox (1982) presented participants with four cards, two of which were labeled with drinks 
(one beer, one a non-alcoholic beverage) and two cards with ages (one over 21 and one 
under 21).  Participants were told that each card had a drink on one side and the age of 
the person drinking on the other side.  Participants were then asked to indicate which 
cards must be checked to determine if people were obeying the law that: ‘if a person is 
drinking beer, then he or she must be over 21.’ 
Unlike in the original formulation, in which only 25% of people selected the two 
cards necessary to test the rule, 75% chose the correct cards in this formulation.  
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) explained the differences found between the two 
formulations by positing that animals would have evolved a mechanism designed to 
detect cheaters over the course of our evolutionary history because this would 
significantly increase fitness.  This would explain why people are good at solving the 
Wason selection task when the context is related to cheating but bad at it when the task is 
provided in abstract terms.  Responses to the Wason selection task can be predicted with 
a high degree of success based on whether the context would activate the hypothetical 
‘cheater detection’ module that Cosmides and Tooby posit. 
 Evidence from evolutionary psychology seems to indicate that our reasoning may 
be much better than the heuristics and biases literature has led us to believe. As with the 
heuristics and biases tradition, Samuels and Stich (2004) have identified three 
increasingly optimistic claims made by evolutionary psychologists: 
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4)  There are many reasoning and decision-making problems on which 
people’s intuitive judgments do not deviate from appropriate norms of 
rationality (295).   
 
5)  Many of the instances in which our judgments and decisions accord 
with appropriate norms of rationality are to be explained by the fact 
that, in making these judgments, we rely on mental modules that were 
designed by natural selection to do a good job at nondemonstrative 
reasoning when provided with the sort of input that was common in 
the environment in which our hominid ancestors evolved (295). 
 
6)  Most or all of our reasoning and decision making is subserved by 
normatively unproblematic “elegant machines” designed by natural 
selection, and thus any concerns about systematic irrationality are 
unfounded (295). 
 
These three claims illustrate just how different the Panglossian position is from 
the heuristics and biases position.  Where heuristics and biases researchers conceive of 
human reasoning and decision-making as relying on the ‘shoddy software’ of 
normatively problematic simple heuristics, evolutionary psychologists hold that most of 
cognition is served well by elegant machines designed to work optimally in almost any 
circumstance we encounter.  Even in cases where the heuristics and biases approach 
suggest that humans are rational, it is quite different from the rationality the evolutionary 
psychology program imagines.  In one case humans are deemed rational because even 
though there is a significant gap between the descriptive abilities of humans and the 
normatively suggested solutions, the impoverished cognitive processing of humans is 
such that they are doing the best they can.  From the Panglossian perspective, humans are 
also doing the best they can, but ‘the best they can’ is quite close to normatively optimal, 
once we have applied the appropriate normative system.  How to resolve the differences 
between these two positions has been one of the primary focuses of the contemporary 
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rationality debate.  In the next section and the remaining chapters the focus of the thesis 
will be on a recent proposal for resolving these differences.       
 
2.4.  A Middle Ground?   
 Recently, philosophers (Samuels & Stich 2004, Samuels forthcoming, Pollock 
1991), psychologists (Evans 2003, Stanovich 1999, 2004, Kahneman and Frederick 
2002), and neuroscientists (Montague 2006) have proposed that the extreme positions of 
the heuristics and biases tradition on the one hand and the Panglossian approach on the 
other can be reconciled with each other through a third, more moderate, position.  
Defenders of this position recognize both that there are many cases in which people 
systematically reason in ways that diverge from normatively predicted responses, but also 
that there are many cases in which people’s responses track the normative solutions quite 
closely.  In terms of the three claims that Samuels and Stich (2004) identify for each 
position, the moderate position accepts both the pessimistic claim (1), which says that on 
a large number of tasks, people deviate from the rationally suggested response and the 
optimistic claim (4) which says that there are a large number of situations in which 
people do behave rationally.  Certainly given the immense amount of reasoning and 
decision-making that people do in everyday life, there is room for each of these claims to 
be true.   Claims (2) and (5) are also both potentially true statements about the 
mechanisms underlying reasoning and decision-making, and there is no prima facie 
reason that these claims are in conflict.  Claim (2) proposed that many cases in which we 
deviate from the rationally suggested response we are relying upon simple heuristics, 
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whereas claim (5) proposed that our rational reasoning and decision-making is 
underscored by evolutionarily selected modules.  Unlike claims (1), (2), (4), and (5) 
however, the moderate takes both claims (3) and (6) to be moments of “rhetorical 
flourish” (Samuels, Stich & Bishop 2002) and more importantly holds that both are most 
likely false.  Nothing in the evidence from either side appears to suggest either that (3), 
which claims that all we have to rely on in decision-making and reasoning are poorly 
performing heuristics, or (6) which claims that all or most decision-making and reasoning 
is supported by “normatively unproblematic” modules are true and when taken as a 
whole, the evidence from each side of the debate seems to falsify the theoretical claim of 
the other.   
To explain the entire set of data from research on reasoning and decision-making, 
this moderate position proposes a dual-process theory in which there are two distinct 
types of cognition.  These two types of processes will be explained in considerable detail 
in the following chapter.  After outlining the dual-process theory, I will argue that the two 
types of cognition are particularly sensitive to two different conceptions of rationality, 
one evolutionary and the other the normative rationality suggested by the Standard 
Picture.  By recognizing that there are two systems each operating according to a 
different conception of rationality, we can make progress in studying human rationality, 
and additionally, develop new paths that both normative and descriptive research in 
rationality should focus on.     
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Chapter 3:  The Dual-Process Theory 
 Dual-process theories have recently become popular explanations of many aspects 
of cognition.  According to dual-process theories, there are two distinct types of systems 
that underlie our cognitive processing (Chaiken & Trope 1999).  One system typically 
operates quickly, is non-conscious, can operate in parallel with other processes, is 
relatively undemanding of cognitive resources, and is often thought to be associated with 
the emotions and intuition.  Many believe that this evolutionarily older system is shared 
with other animal species.  Conversely, the second system is slow at processing 
information, under volitional control, is serial in its information processing, is relatively 
demanding of cognitive resources, and is often associated with reason or rationality.  This 
system is typically thought to have evolved more recently and to be an exclusively human 
property.  Although these two systems have been labeled in many ways depending on the 
domain of interest and the aspects of the systems that particular theorists want to 
highlight, to stay as neutral as possible with regard to the two processes, I will adopt 
Stanovich’s (1999) terminology of calling the two processes simply System 1 and System 
2.5   
 
3.1.  System 1  
 As Stanovich (2004) has pointed out, even the relatively neutral System 1 
terminology brings with it a serious problem.  Specifically, it implies that there is a single 
System 1.  In fact, this is almost certainly not the case.  There are most likely multiple 
                                                 
5
 For a thorough listing of the various theorists and the labels they have given to the two processes, see 
Stanovich (2004: 35).   
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systems that meet the criteria for being considered a System 1 process (exactly what these 
criteria are, and how System 1 processes should be categorized will be addressed 
shortly).  Stanovich writes: “Using a term…which implies a single cognitive system…is 
really a misnomer.  In actuality, the term used should be plural because it refers to a 
(probably large) set of systems” (2004: 37).  Stanovich describes System 1 processes as 
an “autonomous set of systems” (2004: 37) that share many properties with classic 
Fodorian modules (Fodor 1983), but diverge in important ways and should not be thought 
of simply as modules.   
Like modules, System 1 processes are typically fast, automatic, and “mandatory”  
in the sense that “their operation is obligatory when triggered by relevant stimuli; central 
systems cannot make [System 1] processes refrain from triggering.… Central processes 
can, however, override the output of [System 1] in determining a response” (2004: 39).  
System 1 processes operate quickly and place little strain on cognitive resources because 
they have developed through evolutionary history to deal with specific problems common 
in a natural environment, are triggered by a minimal and specific set of stimuli, and 
produce stereotyped responses that do not require conscious control.  Because of this, 
however, System 1 processes are susceptible to error when they are triggered in a 
situation that does not match the environment or problem type in which the process was 
designed to operate efficiently.   
This failing of System 1 has been offered as an explanation of the data of both the 
heuristics and biases approach and the evolutionary psychology approach to reasoning 
and decision-making.  As Samuels, Stich, and Bishop (2002) have pointed out, 
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evolutionary psychologists have focused their research on testing reasoning and decision-
making abilities with an eye to the way these problems would have been presented to our 
evolutionary predecessors.  In doing so they have found that in these types of situations, 
humans (and other animals) are quite good “intuitive statisticians” (Cosmides and Tooby 
1996) and utility maximizers (Glimcher 2003).  In contrast, heuristics and biases research 
has tended to rely on problems that are considerably withdrawn from the format in which 
our predecessors would have received probability information (Kahneman and Tversky 
1973).  We would expect, given the properties associated with System 1, to find 
differences between evolutionarily common and uncommon reasoning and decision-
making problems. 
Unlike Fodorian modules, an important characteristic of System 1 is that they are 
not a clearly specified set of systems.  According to Fodor, modules are exclusive to the 
five senses and language.  System 1 processes are not restricted to these systems.  They 
include many higher cognitive processes, such as reasoning and decision-making, and 
with practice, education, and training, processes that once required System 2 processing 
(which will be explained in the following section) can be integrated with and eventually 
become part of System 1 processes.  This will become an important aspect of the dual-
process theory in relation to rationality, for it will allow for the hope of an ameliorative 
project aimed at improving human reasoning and decision-making so that it more often 
approximates normative rationality.   
Although there is a sense in which System 1 processes are deeply “unintelligent” 
in that they are highly inflexible, responding to simple triggering stimuli regardless of 
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context, and running to completion of their process even in cases where inhibiting this 
response might be advantageous, this simple processing is also their greatest virtue.  
Fodor’s (1983) comments regarding the similar lack of intelligence of modules capture 
this point:  “What you save by this sort of stupidity is not having to make up your mind, 
and making up your mind takes time” (64).  Because humans cognitive resources are 
constrained in many ways, the “fast and frugal” style of System 1 processes are crucially 
important to an organisms survival.   
A final component of System 1, which Stanovich (1999) in particular has stressed 
is the lack of individual differences in System 1 processing.  Evidence supporting this 
claim has come from a series of studies in which performance on reasoning and decision-
making tasks has been compared with standard measures of analytical intelligence (i.e. 
IQ, SAT scores) (Stanovich and West 1998, Capon et al. 2003).   These studies have 
found that in reasoning and decision tasks that emphasize frequency and contextual 
evidence, such as those favored by evolutionary psychologists, there is no correlation 
between performance on the task and analytic intelligence.  However, on tasks of the type 
favored by heuristics and biases researchers, there are significant correlations found 
between performance on the task and analytic intelligence.  These findings have been 
interpreted as offering evidence for the lack of individual differences in System 1 
processing. When tasks are contextual and provided in a frequentist format, for example, 
System 1 processes are likely to arrive at the normatively correct answer, and it is on 
these types of problems that no significant individual differences are found.  On tasks that 
require System 2 analytic capabilities, large individual differences have been found. 
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To summarize, System 1 characterizes kinds of cognitive processes that are fast, 
automatic, unconscious, mandatory, use few cognitive resources, show few individual 
differences and developed relatively early in our evolutionary lineage.  System 1 
processing is highly sensitive to context, and produces near-optimal responses in 
situations that our evolutionary predecessors would have encountered.  As has been 
briefly indicated already, the properties of System 2 stand in stark contrast to the 
properties that have been identified with System 1.  The next section will focus on 
detailing the primary components of System 2 processes.  
 
3.2.  System 2      
 As with System 1 processes, it is likely that System 2 is not one particular system, 
but rather several systems that process information in a particular way.  Whether System 
2 is one system or many is a considerable controversy within the study of dual-process 
theories.  Evans (2002), for instance, has argued that System 2 is necessarily a single 
central processing system because it is only in relation to this system that the multiple 
System 1 processes can be meaningfully grouped.  He writes:  “All that really links dual-
process theories together is the nature of System 2 and the way in which implicit and 
autonomous processes (of whatever kind) appear to compete with it for control of our 
behavior” (205).  Although there may be reasons for thinking that as a matter of fact 
humans have only a single System 2 process, there is certainly no reason that necessarily 
humans must have a singular System 2 process.  Like System 1, it will be most useful 
from the standpoint of making scientific progress to think of System 2 as a particular type 
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of cognition, with several characteristic component parts. It is an empirical question 
whether there are one or many System 2 processes, but it is certainly not foundational to 
the concept of a System 2 process that humans only have one. 
 System 2 processes are characterized by their slow, serial information processing.  
As opposed to System 1 processes that can quickly run many tasks in parallel, System 2 
processing is limited by being able to engage only one task at a time.  System 2 
processing is not only significantly slower than its evolutionarily older counterpart, but 
requires significantly more cognitive resources as well.  These resources include working 
memory capacity, time, and attention among many others.  Taking these problematic 
aspects into consideration, one might initially wonder whether System 2 processes should 
be considered an unfortunate hindrance in our cognitive make-up.  However, System 2 
processes allow for many of our most important capabilities, such as abstract reasoning 
and volitional control and turn out to be of particular importance when considering the 
impact of dual-process theories for the rationality debate. 
 Among the primary advantages of System 2 processing is that it “allows us to 
sustain the powerful context-free mechanisms of logical thought, inference, abstraction, 
planning, decision-making, and cognitive control” (Stanovich 2004: 47).  System 2 
processes allow us to contemplate the future and to think counterfactually and abstractly 
about concepts free of their natural context.  Additionally, and perhaps most 
characteristic of System 2 processing, it allows for conscious control.  Contrary to 
System 1 processes, which respond blindly to specific stimuli and produce a stereotyped 
response that once begun must follow through to completion, the conscious control of 
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System 2 allows for flexibility and creativity in the type of response generated.  As our 
world becomes less and less like the environment that our evolutionary predecessors 
engaged with, this flexibility becomes all the more important.   
 A last component of System 2 processing, and perhaps the most important with 
regard to the stance toward human rationality which I adopt here, is that of its ability to 
“override” System 1 processes.  John Pollock’s (1991) work has been especially 
important in emphasizing this feature of System 2.  For Pollock, this override component 
is crucial for tempering the stereotyped System1 processes when they are activated in an 
environment or situation in which they will produce negative results.  As an example, 
Pollock points to the System 1 process that predicts the trajectory of an object in motion.  
This System 1 process produces quick, and for the most part, reliable judgments about 
trajectory.  However, there are situations and environments in which the System 1 
processes will lead to substantially unreliable judgments of trajectories.6  In these cases, 
System 2 processes can override the System 1 judgments.  Exactly how this override 
ability of System 2 occurs is poorly understood, and an important question to resolve 
within the study of dual-process theories.  As we will see in Chapter 4 however, 
neuroscientific research is beginning to provide us with information about this override 
function of System 2.   
The override problem points to a larger gap in the understanding of dual-process 
theories, that of how the two systems interact with each other.  Although some 
                                                 
6
 For a familiar example of this phenomenon, one might think back to the “moon bounce” balls available in 
many supermarket vending machines that many kids play with.  Because of the imperceptible spin and the 
special properties of the material the balls are made out of, when bounced, the balls would seem to dart and 
bounce in completely unexpected directions.  
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philosophical work has been done on this problem (Scaife manuscript) and several 
theorists have posited plausible theoretical models (Haidt 2001, Evans 2003) the specifics 
of how these systems interact remains in many respects an open question.  As we shall 
see in the next chapter, one of the most promising aspects of taking a cognitive 
neuroscience approach, and in particular a neuroeconomic approach, to the study of 
reasoning and decision-making is that it may provide information about the interactions 
between the two systems in a way that purely behavioral research cannot.   
 To reiterate the key components of System 2 processes, they are typified by slow, 
serial, context-independent processing and have developed relatively recently in our 
evolutionary history.  Additionally, they allow for conscious control, provide substantial 
amounts of flexibility in their operation, but also creating significant demands upon 
cognitive resources, particularly working memory.  A last component common to System 
2 processes is the ability to override the rote, and sometimes unreliable, responses 
generated by System 1 processes.  Although this override component has not been 
thoroughly detailed in the literature, I will propose that a cognitive neuroscience 
approach will shed new light on these interactions.   
 
3.3.  System 1 and System 2 as Investigative  Kinds 
Now that the two systems comprised within dual-process theories have been 
established, it is important understand the most efficient way to study them.  This 
question has recently been addressed by Richard Samuels (forthcoming), who has 
defended a view of System 1 and System 2 as cognitive kinds.  On Samuels’ view, 
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System 1 and System 2 are distinct cognitive kinds because they provide a useful way to 
systematically and reliably decompose cognition.  By and large I agree with Samuels 
analysis of System 1 and System 2, but will adopt the language of investigative kinds 
(Brigandt 2003) as a more useful label for the two systems, in particular because it 
emphasizes their roles in scientific investigation.  Although this is not the place for a 
thorough defense of System 1 and System 2 as investigative kinds, I will present in some 
detail what I take investigative kinds to be, and why it is beneficial to think of System 1 
and System 2 as investigative kinds.     
 Although sections 3.1 and 3.2 identify many important properties, individual 
researchers have tended to focus on a single property that divides processes into either 
System 1 or System 2 processes.  For any distinction that has been made to distinguish 
the two processes, one researcher or another has focused on it as the single criterion for 
classification as either a System 1 or System 2 process.  Although classifying the two 
systems according to this single criterion method has its advantages, chief among them its 
theoretical economy, it suffers from a serious problem.  If dual-process theories merely 
offer the claim that cognitive processes can be divided according to some criteria 
(fast/slow, conscious/unconscious, automatic/controlled), then the theory becomes an 
uninteresting one because the claim is much too broad to lead to useful generalizations in 
scientific investigation.  It looks like the theory, conceived in this way, is probably true, 
but trivially so.  The fact that some cognitive processes are faster than others, or that we 
have more or less control over some processes has been well established in cognitive and 
social psychology, and if this is all that the dual-process theory is illustrating, then it is 
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hard to see what is interesting about it, and even harder to see how it would provide any 
usefulness in scientific investigation.   
 However, dual-process theories do say something interesting about cognition.  
Properly conceived, it is not the fact that cognitive processes vary according to some 
property or other, but that there is a distinct set of properties characteristic of System 1 
and System 2 processes (see Fig. 1 at end of chapter), and that these properties tend to 
cluster together (Samuels forthcoming).  That is to say, cognitive processes that exhibit 
one property thought to be characteristic of System 1 (i.e. fast processing) also tend to 
have several other properties associated with System 1 processing (i.e. automaticity, early 
evolutionary development, and undemanding of cognitive resources).  One of the primary 
advantages of cluster concepts is that they allow for borderline cases, and dispense with 
the need for a rigid set of necessary and sufficient conditions.  Although System 1 
properties tend to cluster together, and likewise for System 2 properties, individual 
System 1 and System 2 processes need not, and likely will not, contain all of the 
properties associated with the system.     
 If this is the proper way to conceive of System 1 and System 2, then it alleviates 
one criticism that has recently been mounted against dual-process theories (Evans 2006).  
This criticism has focused on recent empirical evidence that shows that there are some 
processes that are both fast, automatic, and cognitively cheap, but almost certainly 
evolutionarily recent in human development (Girelli et al. 2000).  It has been argued that 
these types of cases, in which processes exhibit many of the properties of System 1, but 
have some overlap with System 2 properties, put pressure on dual-process theories.  But, 
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if the cluster concept view is correct, then there are no necessary or sufficient properties 
for category membership; all that is required is that the system exhibits a sufficiently 
large number of the properties that characterize it.   
 This formulation of the System 1 and System 2 concepts leads to the question of 
whether they should be considered as natural kinds.  Certainly, the conception of the two 
systems as relatively stable property clusters is in the spirit of many contemporary 
explanations of natural kind concepts (Boyd 1988, 1999, Kornblith 1993, 2002).  
Recently however, Paul Griffiths (2004) has argued that it may be appropriate to cease 
using the label of natural kind as extensively as it currently gets used, due in large part to 
its historical baggage.  As Griffiths points out, “the actual name ‘natural kind’ has been 
rendered increasingly inappropriate by what Boyd has termed the ‘enthusiasm’ for the 
concept to which it refers” (2004: 906).  Emphasizing this enthusiasm, Griffiths points 
out that the insights into scientific practice garnered from the natural kind model have 
been usefully and justifiable applied to areas outside the natural sciences (particularly to 
psychology), but that the term itself is problematic outside of the natural sciences.  As he 
puts it: “Given the historical baggage that attaches to the term ‘natural kind’ and its literal 
inappropriateness to many of the scientific categories to which it is now applied, it seems 
preferable to introduce an alternative” (ibid.)  The alternative which Griffiths favors, and 
which I will adopt here, is that of an investigative kind (Brigandt 2003).   
Ingo Brigandt (2003) introduced the term investigative kind.  Describing 
investigative kinds, Brigandt writes:  
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An investigative kind is a group of things that are presumed to belong 
together due to some underlying mechanism or a structural property. The 
idea that these entities belong to a kind might be due to some interesting 
similarities.  Instead, an investigative kind is specified by some non-trivial 
underlying feature or process that is presumed to account for the observed 
similarities. An investigative kind concept thus originates when a certain 
pattern among a class of objects is observed and it is assumed to be 
founded on some theoretically important, but yet unknown relevant 
mechanism that generates this pattern. (2003: 1309) 
 
Following from this passage, investigate kinds are typified by their role in scientific 
enquiry.  Investigative kinds group together sets in such a way that meaningful inductive 
generalizations can be made based on them.  Brigandt highlights criteria that 
investigative kinds share. These criteria are: 
  
1.  They pick out a set that is presumably related based on an underlying 
structure or mechanism that the members of the set share. 
 
2.  They originate when a pattern is recognized among a class of objects 
that is assumed to be based in some common mechanism or underlying 
structure. 
 
3.  They are associated with the empirical search for the mechanism 
underlying the kind. 
 
4.  They will be guided by hypotheses about the underlying mechanism. 
 
5.  They will likely undergo revision based on findings from scientific 
investigation.  This revision may take the shape of mild adjustments to 
the concept, the splitting of the concept into two distinct concepts, or 
even elimination of the concept completely. 
 
        
 Criteria (1) and (2) illustrate the focus of investigative kind concepts on 
underlying structure and mechanisms that tie together the members of a given 
investigative kind.  For System 1 and System 2 processes, this underlying mechanism 
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takes the form of the property clusters addressed earlier.  Criteria (3) and (4) and (5) 
highlight the interplay between theses concepts and the scientific process.  Investigative 
kinds both shape and are shaped by the empirical research into the concept.  Initial 
hypotheses about the investigative kind concept in question leads to particular research 
questions and methodological approaches.  In turn, the outcomes of these investigations 
provide increasingly rich information about the concept, leading to revision of the initial 
criteria for category membership.   
This process has been carried out over the history of the study of dual-process 
theories.  Dual-process theories were initially posited to explain the perplexing patterns 
of behavior found in reasoning and decision-making research.  They were proposed to 
explain the seemingly conflicting findings of heuristics and biases and evolution 
psychology researchers.  These initial (and quite simplistic compared with current dual-
process theories) theories led to specific programs of research (individual difference 
studies, studies of base-rate neglect) that generated more data that were used to refine and 
reformulate the system 1 and System 2 concepts.  In this back and forth interplay between 
the concept and the empirical data generated from and about it, significant forward 
progress is made.  In the case of dual-process theories this progress has manifested itself 
in an increasingly meaningful way of partitioning cognitive processes, and a deeper and 
richer understanding of many of the most puzzling aspects of particular domains of 
human cognition, including those of interest for present purposes: reasoning and 
decision-making.   
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Recently, a new approach has been taken to studying dual-process theories of 
reasoning and decision-making.  This new cognitive neuroscience approach is already 
uncovering new information about the nature of dual-process theories and in particular 
the way in which system 1 and system 2 interact with each other.  This approach, which 
is the focus of chapter 4, stands to add much to the study of both dual-process theories in 
general and to their role in reasoning and decision-making tasks in particular.   
        
 
System 1 System 2 
Fast Slow  
Automatic Controlled 
Parallel Serial 
Unconscious Conscious  
Context sensitive Not context sensitive 
Evolutionarily Old Evolutionarily young 
Undemanding of resources Demanding of Resources 
Mandatory Flexible 
Few individual differences Significant Individual Differences 
 
Table 1: Characteristic Properties of System 1 and System 2 
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Chapter 4:  Evidence From the Cognitive Neuroscience of Judgment and Decision-
Making 
Recently, several studies have applied a cognitive neuroscience approach to 
studying human reasoning and decision-making.  This approach merges traditional 
behavioral tasks, such as those discussed in chapter 2, with modern neuroscientific 
methodologies such as single-cell recordings and neuroimaging.  Much of this research 
has come to be known as neuroeconomics.  Although still a field in its infancy, 
neuroeconomics—the merging of methodologies and research questions from 
neuroscience, economics, and cognitive psychology—has already made significant 
contributions to the understanding of human decision-making.  By bringing 
methodologies from the neurosciences to bear on these questions, there is potential to 
more thoroughly understand how decisions are made, and also to begin comparing 
information about human neurobiology with the hypothetical cognitive mechanisms 
posited in much of cognitive science.  It is this last aspect that has been of most 
usefulness in relation to dual-process theories.   
Part of the conception of System 1 and System 2 processes as investigative kinds 
is the notion that all instances of the kind are connected by some underlying structure or 
mechanism.  Although there is much that can be learned from purely behavioral studies, 
they are also limited in many well-known ways.  Chief among their limitations is that 
they give almost no direct evidence about the mechanisms underlying the domain in 
question.  Daniel Gilbert (1999) humorously illustrates this point with an analogy 
between the psychological researcher and a good detective.  He writes: 
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Although a talented detective may be able to rule out one or more 
architectures, no detective can rule in just one…. When inferences about 
architecture are informed only by knowledge of inputs (tap tap) and 
outputs (spurt spurt) then the conceptual Erector Set of gates, sensors, and 
other optional accessories affords the creative tinder an endless number of 
ways to link the tapping to the spurting. (8) 
 
It is in improving this shortcoming of behavioral methodologies that cognitive 
neuroscience is most beneficial.  Although it brings with it a host of its own 
methodological worries,7 these are not insurmountable, and the benefits of a cognitive 
neuroscience approach allow researchers to ask questions and investigate their area of 
interest at a level that would never be possible through traditional behavioral studies.  
The ability to open up the ‘black box’ of the mind for the first time, and to examine the 
physical processes occurring in the brain allow for significantly stronger inferences about 
the mechanisms underlying reasoning and decision-making.        
Cognitive neuroscience also allows for decision-making research to occur at 
several levels.  Studies using neuroimaging technologies such as functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have captured much of the interest in the area, but there is 
also significant work being done both at the molecular level (Kosfeld et al. 2005) and at 
the single neuron level (Glimcher 2003).  By operating at multiple levels, and using 
multiple methodologies, the cognitive neuroscience approach has quickly developed an 
impressive amount of information about the workings of the brain during decision-
making and reasoning tasks.   
                                                 
7
 See Hardcastle & Stewart (2002) for a particularly thoughtful critique of cognitive neuroscientific 
methodologies.  Among the criticisms of fMRI are that it lacks sufficient spatial and temporal resolution, 
that it measures neural activity indirectly through blood flow, and that appropriate parameters for data 
analysis have yet to be developed and widely accepted.  
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Although the field is still far too young to draw conclusive arguments one way or 
the other about whether humans are rational or not, there is already ample evidence from 
which we can begin to see how major problems within the rationality debate may be 
resolved.  The remainder of this chapter will first discuss the brain regions that have been 
proposed as neural correlates of System 1 and System 2 processes.  I will then review 
several recent studies from the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning and decision-making.  
These studies lend additional support to the dual-process theory of decision-making, and 
have proved especially useful in improving our understanding of the way that System 1 
and System 2 interact in the brain. 
Matthew Lieberman (2007) has proposed that the neuroscience of higher-level 
cognition (particularly social cognition such as decision-making) can be fruitfully studied 
by adopting a dual-process theory.  He focuses largely on the automatic and controlled 
features of System 1 and System 2 respectively, and has suggested several brain areas 
that may underlie System 1 and System 2 processing.  There is often a danger in 
cognitive neuroscience research that the ‘how’ question which motivated the research 
(i.e. how do people make decisions) will be replaced with a potentially less useful 
‘where’ question (which areas of the brain are active when people make decisions).  Both 
because of this concern, and because of issues of space within this thesis, I will briefly 
lay out some of the primary brain areas which have been implicated with regard to 
System 1 and System 2, and then turn more thoroughly to how knowledge of these areas 
can is useful in furthering the understanding of dual-process theories and the neural-basis 
of decision-making and reasoning. 
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The brain systems that Lieberman (2007) nominates as potentially underlying 
System 1 processes include the amygdala, basal ganglia, lateral temporal cortex (LTC), 
ventromedial cortex (VMPFC), and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC).  In keeping 
with the criteria for System 1 processes, each of these brain systems has been implicated 
in automatic, non-conscious, and relatively fast aspects of cognitive processing.  
Additionally, each of these brain systems developed relatively early in our evolutionary 
history.     
In contrast to these brain systems, Lieberman proposes several others that may 
underlie System 2 processing.  These include the rostral anterior cingulated cortex 
(rACC), lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), posterior parietal cortex (PPC), hippocampus 
and medial temporal lobe (MTL).  Lieberman emphasizes the LPFC in particular, writing 
that it is “the heart of [System 1], as it is involved in numerous higher cognitive processes 
that are experienced as intentional and effortful, including working memory, 
implementation of top-down goals and plans, episodic retrieval, inhibition, and self-
control” (296)8.  Although much of the work that Lieberman relies upon when 
categorizing brain systems relevant to System 1 and System 2 comes from studies of 
specific brain areas, recent research has focused on the relationships between System 1 
and System 2 brain areas during different types of cognitive and social tasks.  This 
research is quickly expanding the understanding of how the two systems relate and 
interact with each other. 
                                                 
8
 Although this is not the place to review the large literature on each of the brain areas implicated, 
interested readers can find references in Lieberman (2007) to primary research on each brain area.    
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One method for investigating the neural basis of dual-process theories is to have 
participants use tasks that would use characteristically System 1 or System 2 processing.  
If dual-process theories are correct, and if there are distinct brain systems that underlie 
System 1 and System 2 processes, then there should be significantly different brain areas 
activated during tasks that heavily favor System 1 or System 2 processing.  In fact, in 
studies of many areas of cognitive and social neuroscience, including categorization, 
prejudice, self-knowledge, and personality, it was found that when the tasks strongly 
favored System 1 processing, the brain areas noted by Lieberman (2007) as relevant for 
System 1 were significantly active, whereas when the tasks favored System 2 processing, 
the areas noted by Lieberman as relevant for System 2 were significantly active (Rauch et 
al. 1995, Cunningham et al. 2003, Lieberman & Eisenberger 2004, Eisenberger et al. 
2005).  Although there is certainly much more research that needs to be done, and in 
many ways the study of the neuroscientific basis of dual-process theories is still in its 
infancy, these studies, and many others like them give good evidence in favor of dual-
process theories of cognition.   
As briefly mentioned above, one way in which neuroscientific evidence can 
advance our understanding of dual-process theories is by allowing insight into the 
interactions between System 1 and System 2.  It is thought that one function of System 2 
is to override System 1 in specific situations in which its fast, automatic, and non-
conscious processing might be disadvantageous.  To study this theory, cognitive 
neuroscientists have begun to investigate aspects of cognition where it is thought that an 
override of automatic processing is likely to occur.  One of the most promising areas for 
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this approach is in the regulation and suppression of emotions.  It has been found in 
multiple studies that passively viewing emotionally salient images correlated 
significantly with amygdala and VMPFC activation (both regions thought to underlie 
System 1 processing), whereas when participants were told to consciously try to regulate 
their emotional response to the images, there was a correlation with both decreased 
activation of the amygdala and VMPFC and significant activation of the LPFC (Ochsner 
et al. 2002, Gross 1998).  Additionally, it was found that during these emotion regulation 
tasks, the larger the LPFC response was during reappraisal, the smaller the amygdala and 
VMPFC responses were during reappraisal.  As Lieberman (2007) puts it:  
…some participants activated the LPFC a lot and others just a little.  The 
more any participant activated LPFC, the greater the reduction in [System 
1] activity.  This analysis suggests that [System 2] is not merely “speaking 
more loudly” than [System 1].  Rather, it appears that, under certain 
circumstances, while [System 2] is speaking up, it is also taking away 
[System 1’s] “microphone,” so that its volume is diminished. (303) 
 
The findings of these studies, as well as several from the neuroeconomic literature which 
will be discussed shortly, have provided significant evidence in favor of dual-process 
theories of cognition.  As illustrated so far, there are relatively stable sets of brain regions 
that are highly correlated with System 1 processing and System 2 processing, as well as 
some evidence that shows neurally how System 2 might override System 1 in certain 
situations.  Although this research provides a strong foundation for a general 
understanding of the neural basis of dual-process models of cognition, it hasn’t looked 
specifically at the areas of cognition that are of interest in this thesis, reasoning and 
decision-making.  Recently, researchers have begun to study the neural underpinnings of 
reasoning and decision-making. This research has been collectively termed 
  43  
neuroeconomics, and in only a short period of time, it has already begun to provide an 
understanding of what is happening in the brain when people make decisions.  The 
remainder of this chapter will focus on research from this exciting new field.                      
 Providing some of the best recent evidence for a dual-process theory of decision-
making is Sanfey et al.’s (2003) article “The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making 
in the Ultimatum Game.”  Sanfey et al.’s experiment makes use of a well-known game 
from behavioral economics-- the ultimatum game.  In the ultimatum game, subjects are 
placed in pairs and each is given a role in the game.  One is the proposer and the other is 
the responder.  The proposer is given $10 to divide up between herself and the receiver 
however she sees fit.  After the proposer has divided the money, the offer is then told to 
the responder, who can either accept what the proposer has given him, or reject the offer, 
in which case neither player gets any money.  This game is of particular interest because 
it offers, at least according to many theories of economic rationality, very clear 
predictions about how rational agents should play the game.  According to expected 
utility, the proposer should always give as little as possible, because that maximizes the 
money that she keeps for herself, and the responder should accept any offer, no matter 
how small, because it is always better to have some money than to have no money, which 
is what he will receive if he rejects the offer.  In multiple studies it has been found that 
people often behave irrationally by rejecting low offers (those in which the receiver is 
offered 3 or less of the 10 dollars).        
 In Sanfey et al.’s experiment, participants played the ultimatum game as the 
responder while in an fMRI scanner.  The proposer was played by a computer, which 
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played a specific pattern of offers.  The participants were deceived into believing that 
they were actually playing against another human except in control cases, in which they 
were told that they were playing a computer.  To simplify the game, only the following 
divisions of the $10 were used during the game: {5,5}, {7,3}, {8,2}, and {9,1}.   
 The results of the brain scans showed that three areas of the brain showed 
significant activation during games: the anterior insula (AI), the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).  As noted previously, the 
DLPFC and the ACC have been implicated in System 2 processing, while the AI is 
known to be associated with disgust, pain, and negative emotions in general (Derbyshire 
et al. 1997, Calder et al. 2001).  The study found that during low offers, activity in the AI 
was increased.  When the activity in the insula became more active than the activity in 
the DLPFC and ACC, the player tended to reject the offer.  When the activity of the 
DLPFC and the ACC were higher than that of the AI, the participant tended to accept the 
offer.  When the participants were aware that they were playing against a computer, 
regardless of whether the offer was unfair or not, AI was not activated to the degree that 
it was activated during interpersonal play, the assumption being that the players did not 
have an emotional response (or at least not one of corresponding intensity) to a low offer 
from a computer. 
 This study provides a fascinating first glance at multiple systems competing in the 
brain to produce decision-making behavior.  From these results, it appears that when 
presented with a low offer, there are multiple brain areas, one of which (DLPFC) has 
already been proposed as a neural correlate of System 2 processes, while the other (AI) is 
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known to be implicated in negative emotions and pain.  By measuring the relative activity 
of these two areas, a high degree of predictive power about a participant’s choice is 
gained.  This suggests that counter to traditional models, which suggests that there is just 
one system of cognitive processing occurring during decision-making, that by embracing 
dual-process theories, and investigating them through cognitive neuroscience methods, 
we can gain a deeper insight into how decisions are made. 
 McClure et al. (2004) reported further evidence in support of a dual-process 
theory of decision-making.  They were interested in how to explain the phenomena of 
inequity in time discounting.  According to traditional models of economic rationality 
(Koopmans 1960), agents should treat equal delays in time equally (e.g. the difference in 
utility between receiving a reward today instead of 24 hours later should be equal to the 
difference in utility between receiving a reward in one year as opposed to one year and 
one day).  However, when tested, people offered $10 now or $11 tomorrow tend to take 
the immediate option, while when offered $10 in a year or $11 in a year and a day people 
tent to take the $11.   
 McClure et al. (2004) theorized that inequity in time discounting could be 
explained in terms of the interactions between multiple neural systems.  Explaining this 
they write:   
Short-run impatience is driven by the limbic system, which responds 
preferentially to immediate rewards and is less sensitive to the value of 
future rewards, whereas long-run patience is mediated by the lateral 
prefrontal cortex and associated structures, which are able to evaluate 
trade-offs between abstract rewards, including rewards in the more distant 
future. (2004:504)  
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This hypothesis was taken to be plausible based on previous findings in several areas.  
First, discrepancies in time discounting appear to be a uniquely human characteristic.  In 
almost all other species, including our closest primate relatives, delay of gratification is 
virtually undocumented (Kagel et al. 1995).  Given that one of the primary 
neuroanatomical differences between humans and all other species is the size of 
prefrontal cortex, they hypothesized that gratification delay might have its neural 
substrates broadly in this area.  Additionally, evidence from patients with brain damage 
has suggested that damage to the prefrontal cortex often leads to a diminished ability for 
long term planning, as well as a tendency toward preferences for immediate rewards 
(Damasio 1994).   
 On these grounds, McClure et al formulated three empirically testable hypotheses.   
1) When given a choice that includes an option for an immediate reward, limbic 
structures will be preferentially engaged relative to choices that do not include 
an immediate reward.   
  
2) Areas in prefrontal cortex will exhibit similar activity across all choice 
conditions relative to when the participant is at rest. 
 
3) When a participant chooses a delayed reward option, there will be greater 
activity in lateral prefrontal areas that in limbic areas. 
 
To test these hypotheses, participants were given a series of choices between 
smaller offers received earlier (i.e. $5 immediately following completion of the task) or 
larger but delayed offers ($40 given in six weeks) while in an MRI scanner.  McClure et 
al found that all three of their hypotheses were validated.  Areas traditionally associated 
with the limbic system (ventral striatum, medial orbitofrontal cortex, and medial 
prefrontal cortex) were significantly more activated when immediate rewards were 
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offered than in trials in which immediate rewards were not offered.  They also found that 
across all decisions, there was significant activation of several areas of lateral prefrontal 
cortex, supporting their second hypothesis.  Most interestingly from a dual-process 
perspective, they found that when the areas found to be significant in the prefrontal 
cortex were significantly more active limbic structures, participants were significantly 
more likely to choose the delayed choice over the immediate choice.   
These two studies as well as several others in related areas such as moral 
judgment (Greene et al. 2001, 2004) and reasoning (Goel & Dolan 2003) have all found 
that when the activity of the brain is examined, it appears to operate as if there are two 
types of processes which interact, and based on this interaction, behavior is highly 
predictable.  The findings from these studies are highly suggestive of a biologically 
realistic dual-process theory, which McClure et al point to when they write:  “Human 
behavior is often governed by a competition between lower level, automatic processes 
that may reflect evolutionary adaptations to particular environments, and the more 
recently evolved, uniquely human capacity for abstract, domain general reasoning and 
future planning” (2004 506).  This characterizes the dual-process theory well, and the 
behavioral data gathered in conjunction with the imaging data makes the case even 
stronger.  One of the hallmarks of System 1 processing is that it is relatively fast 
compared to System 2.  McClure et al. (2004) found that when participants chose the 
immediate reward, they were significantly faster than when they chose the delayed, but 
larger reward.  Additionally, in many of these studies it has been pointed out that the 
faster, evolutionarily older system also has a strong affective or emotional component 
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related to it, which although not addressed in detail in the earlier discussion of System 1 
processing is often thought to be included among the properties typical of the process 
(Sanfey et al. 2006).    
Although these studies are only an initial step toward understanding the biological 
mechanisms underlying reasoning and decision-making, they suggest that a cognitive 
neuroscience approach will be a highly fruitful one to take.  Not only does it help to 
confirm many of the theoretical claims made about dual-process theories, but it also 
allows a way to begin making progress into understanding (1) the underlying mechanisms 
of the two systems and also (2) the interactions between System 1 and System 2 
processes.  These have traditionally been two of the most difficult to investigate aspects 
of dual-process theories, and also two of the most important.  Particularly when trying to 
draw conclusions about human rationality, whether or in which circumstances humans 
are able to override the older, more hardwired System 1 processes with the more flexible 
System 2  is crucial.  In the next chapter, I will conclude by returning to the question 
underlying this thesis: are humans rational?  Like many who endorse a dual-process view 
of reasoning and decision-making, I think the answer is neither as pessimistic as some 
have claimed nor as optimistic as others have asserted.   
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Chapter 5.  Conclusion 
If it is the case that human reasoning and decision-making are best understood 
within a dual-process framework as I have suggested throughout this thesis, then what 
does this mean for the study of human rationality?  I think it signals a shift in the way that 
we traditionally conceive of the most important questions within the study of rationality.  
In this final chapter, I will suggest where I think the study of rationality should focus at 
both the normative and the descriptive level.  Fully drawing out the implications of a 
dual-process theory of reasoning and decision-making for rationality would be the work 
of a much larger and more ambitious project, which I hope to undertake in the future.  
But, in this chapter I will sketch the direction that I think fruitful projects within the 
rationality debate should head.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, heuristics and biases researchers have taken a fairly 
pessimistic view of human rationality based on many studies that appear to show that 
people do not perform according to the prescriptions of various normative theories.  
Conversely, evolutionary psychologists have argued that humans are by and large 
rational, and have produced their own research to defend this position.  I believe that 
dual-process models give us an explanation of why we find these apparently conflicting 
results.   
As Stanovich (2004) has suggested, one fallout of the System 1 and System 2 
processes is that they accord well with two different conceptions of rationality.  The 
evolutionarily older, fast, and automatic System 1 is highly attuned to evolutionary 
rationality, in which to be rational is to reason or choose so as to maximize fitness.  Over 
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the course of human evolutionary history, System 1 has developed to be highly successful 
at leading to those choices that maximize the fitness of the genes of an individual.    
System 2, on the other hand, allows for the maximization of the type of normative 
rationality that has been discussed throughout this thesis, the rationality that Stein (1996) 
calls the Standard Picture.  In most cases, both of these systems of rationality propose the 
same choice.  That is to say, most of the time the choice that is optimal according to the 
Standard Picture is also optimal according to evolutionary rationality.  But, there is 
nonetheless a significant amount of decision-making and reasoning in which the two 
systems of rationality do not suggest the same choice.        
Evolutionary psychologists have tended to focus their research on studies in 
which the reasoning or decision-making tasks are presented in a way that would make use 
of evolutionarily older, System 1 cognitive processes.  Additionally they have focused on 
cases in which rationality in both the evolutionary and the Standard Picture sense 
prescribes the same choice.  On the other hand, heuristics and biases researchers have 
focused on decision and reasoning tasks in which System 1 processes lead to sub-optimal 
choices, or on cases in which the evolutionary and Standard Picture systems of rationality 
suggest different outcomes.  Because of these different focuses, the two groups came to 
radically different notions of human rational capacity.   
Approaching human rationality from a dual-process perspective opens up new 
questions at both the descriptive and the normative/prescriptive level.  Descriptively, the 
questions of when and how humans are able to override System 1 processes with System 
2 control becomes crucial.  Additionally, the question of whether people can become 
  51  
better at overriding System 1 through education and cognitive training becomes crucial.  
In answering these two questions, I believe that a cognitive neuroscience approach will 
become particularly useful.  It offers us the best current methodology by which to 
investigate and understand the unique interactions between the multiple systems in the 
brain that lead to decision-making and reasoning.  By better understanding the biological 
and neural properties of each system, we will be better able to answer the descriptive 
questions which, if dual-process theories are correct, are most important.       
At the normative level new questions for research are introduced as well.  
Primarily, a new prescriptive question that arises is when one should make choices in 
accord with System 1 and when one should override System 1 choices with System 2 so 
as to accord with the Standard Picture of rationality.  Certainly it is not the case that, even 
if it were possible, one would want to always override System 1 processes.  After all, 
there are many, many cases in which the fast and automatic decision-making of System 1 
is far superior to the slow, and consciously controlled System 2.  When one inadvertently 
steps into the street in the path of a speeding car, it is certainly better to react quickly, 
relying on hardwired System 1 processes than to contemplate the costs and benefits of 
returning to the sidewalk as opposed to getting hit by a car.   
The normative question becomes when ought one rely on System 1 and when 
ought one rely on System 2.  By developing research into this question, human decision-
making stands to be significantly improved.  Much of the problem within the rationality 
debate has been that since both ends of the debate assumed only one type of cognitive 
processing, they did not see a large opportunity for improving human rational capacities.  
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Dual-process theories suggest that there may be room for significantly  improving our 
rational abilities.  In order to develop this potential however, it will require research into 
the questions suggested here at both the descriptive and prescriptive level.  Moreover, 
both of these new programs will be highly interrelated.  As more descriptive information 
is uncovered about when and how people can override System 1 processes with System 2 
processes, the normative and prescriptive conclusions about when one ought to override 
System 1 may change.  Moreover, the question of whether humans descriptively are 
rational will become a matter of whether, given the capacities of System 1 and System 2, 
they actually do override System 1 when it is prescribed that they ought to.        
Throughout this thesis I have proposed that the traditional rationality debate, with 
the pessimistic claims of heuristics and biases researchers representing one end of the 
debate and the Panglossian claims of evolutionary psychologists representing the other, 
has missed a crucial moderate position which becomes viable if dual-process theories of 
cognition are possible.  I have suggested that there is good reason to believe that dual-
process models are a useful distinction within the study of reasoning and decision-
making, especially when conceived of as investigative kind cluster concepts.  Moreover, I 
have suggested that there is now growing evidence about the neural underpinnings of 
dual-process theories, and that this evidence is opening up a new understanding of the 
way that the two systems interact to produce behavior.  In this last chapter I have briefly 
sketched where I think rationality research, both descriptive and normative, should focus 
its attention in the future.   
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Within the context of the rationality debate, dual-process theories are an exciting 
and I believe important contribution.  After more than 40 years of productive and 
extremely important research from both ends of the rationality debate, we are currently at 
a point where a new and radically different approach can be taken.  By merging 
methodologies ranging from philosophy to psychology and from economics to 
neuroscience, a wealth of new information is being gathered and our knowledge is 
expanding at an incredible rate.  It appears that if this interdisciplinary approach 
continues on its current path, a significantly improved understanding of what it means for 
humans to be rational is almost on the horizon.         
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